The case for Organic Democracy

Rhodes Napier

British politics is frustrating. There is a growing mandate for radical change, but no existing faction capable of channelling this discontent into support for permanent, structural reforms. Not since the 1970s has there been as widespread discontent about the state of Britain. Yet this time the anger and ennui is characterised by a deeper, more fundamental pessimism about the future of the country. People, hitherto protected from the worst excesses of multicultural Britain, are beginning to dimly intuit that the country has suddenly and dramatically changed for the worse. Middle Englanders now notice Romani families spawning under bridges, idling lockdown-migrants populating previously pristinely native towns and (more alarmingly) the sequestering of dangerous, Middle Eastern migrants next to Catholic girls' schools. The revisiting of migrant rape gangs has further damaged the residual perception amongst some that modern Britain is a civilized country. The violence, depravity, and unadulterated racial hatred which characterised crimes from Glasgow to Bristol is finally seeping into (at least part of) the national consciousness.

But there is no 'nationalist' Thatcher around the corner, waiting to upend Britain's destructive social contract, which sees native taxpayers subsidise the legal defence of Pakistani rapists. While Katie Lamb's public intervention on the crimes in Bradford is much welcome, her rhetorical position is remains unsatisfactory. Miss Lamb, but also Nigel Farage, Neil O'Brien and Robert Jenrick fail to match the growing demand for justice and genuine change from a broad cohort of voters with any serious prescriptions. MPs reiterate the hateful venom spouted by Kashmiri pimps in the House of Commons, but always fail to take these revelations to the following conclusion. If certain immigrant diasporas exhibit cultural pathologies to a far greater degree than the native population, then logically they should be voluntarily, and when appropriate, involuntarily repatriated. If we accept past legal immigration has been harmful, this should commit us to reversing its effect. The moral harm to diasporics allegedly committed in deporting them is trivial when compared to the moral harm done to natives by permitting the continuance of multiculturalism.

What we might term the Lowe-Jenrick line on the British right (mass deportations of illegals, selective expulsion of Hamas supporters and foreign rapists) fails in this fundamental regard. They view the impositions on British society by the left as an irreversible fait accompli. Consequently their criticisms of multiculturalism can only be refracted through the prism of 'British values' which serves to buttress the paradigms of the occupation regime. By presenting the problem with foreign diasporas as a failure of 'integration' and the solution to be one of dirigiste integration programs, the left is ultimately equipped with further future tools to persecute dissidents. The early 2010s discourse around multiculturalism, in which bovine centre right commentators suggested civics lesson as a way of combatting violent Islamism, birthed us Prevent. Emphasis on the enforcement of state-centric values and corresponding 'counter-extremism' measures inevitably saw anyone who fell foul of CY's social values, deemed a security threat.

We see the centre-right's indebtedness to Cameronite paradigms most conspicuously now with regards to the current moral panic about the 'Muslim extremist vote'. The handful of independents elected from Muslim enclaves in Bradford, Birmingham and Leicester are an object of fixation for figures like Jenrick. And yet these MPs, who are monistically focused on Gaza and Kashmir, pose no real political threat and undermine the coherence of the left. Ayoub Khan and Tahir Ali, who speak like set characters from Four Lions, are not the harbingers of an emergent Houellebecqian electoral coalition. If anything, they represent the increasing unlikelihood of an 'Islamo-guachiste' victory. As the 2024 general election witnessed Muslim voters are leaving the proverbial plantation.

Muslims no longer want to be represented by white Baathists like Galloway, let alone shrill apparatchiks like Rayner. They increasingly vote for Muslims whose only political interests are foreign policy ones, beyond totemic interventions on semi-habitual Quran burnings. The worst case scenario was the one we’ve lived through for forty years, in which social democrats could rely on the quiescent support of ethnic political machines. The demographic colonisation of inner city areas no longer favours political parties committed to further demographic replacement.

The circumstances which lead to Bradford West electing someone like Iqbal Mohamed – the demographic replacement of large parts of inner city Britain — is objectionable in and of itself, and cannot be contested vicariously through its electoral by-products. Obviously, if you're going to have majority Muslim constituencies, you are going to have sectarian elements in British politics. You cannot oppose the former by focusing on the latter's threat to 'liberal democracy', because nativist white sentiment-which the 'new populists' of the Tory right want to mobilise-is also deemed such a threat.

The government which will emerge in some form in 2029 will be a quasi-populist one. It will not provide the solutions the country needs; its diagnoses of the basic problems, and therefore its corresponding prescriptions, will be wrong ones. It could also be dangerous, rather than merely misguided, if it ends up strengthening state repressive measures, by expanding 'anti-extremism' policies, banning 'hate marches' and so on. In particular, we should be worried about the possibility of some kind of latter-day 'Test Act' which aims to prevent Muslim independents from contesting constituencies on the grounds that they are 'Islamists'. This will be popular, because most Native British people find the presence of someone like Ayoub Khan in the House of Commons offensive. But it will also strengthen the mainstream political left considerably, and potentially allow them to present themselves as the only protectors of Islam against a 'racist' and 'Zionist' Conservative-Reform hybrid. This will be particularly problematic if by the 2030s the Gaza situation has lost the domestic salience it currently has.

If a future, serious British right is going to politically repress the left, they shouldn't focus on ethnocentric Muslim independents, but on the broader, anti-British ideological superstructure which permeates the state. It should be noted that sectarianism, and the symbiotic enmeshment of the Labour party with immigrant diasporas, has been a key feature of left-wing politics in Britain for decades. Tower Hamlets, West Bradford and Oldham have long seen electoral corruption on the part of 'community leaders' who have harvested postal votes for left wing candidates. Labour MPs, from a variety of non-white ethnic backgrounds, have expressed explicit animus against British people on the basis of their own ancestral origins. If its wrong for Muslim politicians like Tahir Ali to lobby for an airport in Azad Kashmir, then its far more wrong for David Lammy to call for reparations for Afro-Caribbean states, who he explicitly identifies with in opposition to Britain. The latter is a far more aggressive register of dual loyalty than the former, but was largely unpicked up on by the British right wing commentariat.