Crisis in the Horn of Africa

An opportunity for remigratory diplomacy?

By Rhodes Napier

For any dispassionate observer of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence, the episode can’t help but elicit some schadenfreude at the apparent disunity of the Ummah. Somalis prostrating themselves in Salah, using the white and blue flag of the Zionist entity as impromptu prayer mats has caused much consternation amongst Five Pillar types and diaspora pan-nationalists. The usual accusations of Western and Zionist interference have followed, but for all phlegmatic conspiracy mongering, Tel Aviv’s diplomatic outreach was a recognition of a political reality.

While Somalis have seen their already poor reputation (piracy, rape and terrorism being the country’s principal exports) reach a new nadir amidst the fallout of the mass defrauding of the Minnesotan welfare state, the Hargeisa based statelet stands as a model of good governance in a region plagued by instability. Indeed, it is one of the perversions of international norms that the polity which meets the criteria of a Weberian nation state is regarded as illegitimate, whilst the Mogadishu based one, which controls little beyond its capital, retains diplomatic recognition.

Perhaps there is some HBD explanation as to why the northern tribes manage to function in contrast to the internecine violence of their southern co-ethnics (80% of Somalilanders are Isaacs, a clan which experienced a near genocide under the dictatorship of Siad Barre). Given this wider context, we should regard the desire of northern Somalis to separate as entirely legitimate.

Israel’s initiatives in the region are part of a wider diplomatic push to carve out allies and clients in an increasingly hostile global context. Obviously Somaliland, poised as it is towards the Gulf of Aden and opposite Yemen’s Houthis, has a strategic importance for the Jewish state. But, as has been discussed previously, it has also been muted (alongside the Sudan, the DRC, Libya, as well as the Kingdom of Morocco) as a destination for Gazans. The Sudan has also seen Israeli outreach, with a general diplomatic and Mossad mission to Khartoum taking place in 2019 in the aftermath of revolution and coup d’etat. Sudan, like Somalia, no longer has a functioning central government since the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) revolted against the Khartoum based junta. The Israeli state has been internally divided on whether to back the Afro-Arab Darfurian Janjaweed insurgents or the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) government. Israel has sought to utilise instability in its far abroad to further nascent plans for demographic dispersal. Indeed, the Sahel, from Dakar to Port Sudan, is in a liminal period of political reordering, with new governments and states being formed out of the refuses of post-colonial entities.

Many might legitimately worry about the new civil conflicts in the region engendering further mass migration to Europe. Of course, the Arab Spring eventually did result in millions of Syrian migrants being settled in Northern Europe by hostile domestic state actors.

But where others might see danger, we should see opportunity. In the era of remigratory diplomacy, the partial state collapse of Third World countries provides relatively greater leverage for even unilaterally acting First World governments. There are a variety of factions and would be statelets in the region seeking international legitimacy, aid, and sometimes critically needed military support. Israel, a nation of 10 million, has been courting potential destinations for Palestinians for over a decade. While, of course, this has been done within the framework of a supportive American administration, a concert of European states (e.g. a Reform and RN lead entente) or even a single state could begin the process of third-party resettlement by simply offering diplomatic recognition in return for hosting deportees or even voluntary emigrants.

It should be noted that the Sahel region is a natural destination for Europe’s Muslim and non-white diasporas. It is a racially liminal zone broadly divided between Berbers, a variety of Arab identifying (but in reality, Afro-Arab) ethnic groups and Bantu tribes. The semi-Semitic groups dominating these states would welcome Muslim Caucasoids as a demographic buttress against their erstwhile black ethnic competitors. As I noted in my original article, both Sudan and Somaliland did, in fact, host refugees from Syria and Yemen, respectively. It was a feature of South Sudanese and Darfurian conspiracies at the time that this was part of an incipient program of demographic Arabisation. We could aid Sahelian elites’ programs of Blanqueamiento while simultaneously resolving our own migration crisis.

For the remainder of this article, I will attempt to provide an overview of each state, some historical context, and why it could be a potential destination for resettled denaturalised persons.

Somaliland (and Puntland)

Somaliland, the northern most region of the nominally existing Republic of Somalia, was, as most J’accuse readers know, a British possession until 1960, before being quickly absorbed into the UN (and Italian administered) Trust Territory of Somaliland. While anti-colonial critics identify the origins of Somalia’s dysfunction in the alleged indiscriminate union of different clan groupings by indifferent administrators, the formation of a pan-Somali state was done at the behest of local leaders (and despite the wishes of British governors).

Fast forwarding to the 1970s, Siad Barre had become military dictator. His regime-generically developmentalist and ‘progressively’ anti-colonial-antagonised traditionalist segments of Somali society. Its ultimate failure in the Ogden War against Ethiopia eventually saw Mujahedeen groups rising against the socialist government in Mogadishu. In particular, the Isaaq clan (who constitute 80% of Somaliland’s population) revolted, in turn precipitating an attempted genocide of their lineage (around 80% of Hargeisa was destroyed in government artillery barrages). Somaliland was effectively independent by the early 1990s (Barre was forced into exile, and no successor was able to fill the power vacuum) and formally declared independence in 2001. Since then, the government has sought international recognition on the world stage and has been something of an object of sympathy of the international right (UKIP’s pre-referendum policies included recognition of its statehood). By any objective metric, the state is extremely impoverished. However, some of this is attributable to its geopolitical isolation (certainly, the region has some development potential given the strategically placed port of Berbera).

Politically stable and in dire need of foreign aid, it makes a perfect remigratory hotspot. Not only could we expect Somaliland to take back members of its own respective clan diasporas, but it could also host a variety of Arab and Muslim South Asian migrants, even as a temporary holding place prior to eventual repatriation. It should be noted that local councils in Bristol, Cardiff and Sheffield, some of the major centres of the Somali population outside of London, have recognised Somaliland’s independence, and therefore it might be reasonable to assume that a significant part of the ~200,000 Somalis in our country originate from there. The fallout of the loss of remittances could be compensated for either through the purchasing of citizenship for non-ethnic Somalis or alternatively through direct financial aid in the return for the construction of de facto extraterritorial plantations (the guarding and low level administering of these centres could provide further financial boosts to the local economy).

Puntland is a similarly de facto breakaway statelet, neighbouring Somaliland to the south (it is the self-proclaimed homeland of the Harti clan). While it has not sought external formal diplomatic, it faces analogous problems of geopolitical and economic isolation and has a similarly low population density of 20/km2 (versus Somaliland’s 31 people/km²). A British and perhaps European diplomatic mission could utilise it to resettle both ethnic Somalis and Muslim diasporas in the region.

Sudan

Sudan, as a spacious and ethnically conflictual zone, has the most potential for multilateral resettlement. It has been in the depths of a civil war since its 2019 revolution, which saw the Islamist leading government of Omar Bashir overthrown. The political insurrection was stillborn, however, as, a month after the president’s resignation, the Sudanese Armed Forces established a notionally “caretaker” government, which has become effectively permanent. It was in this context that the Rapid Defence Forces (Janjaweed militias used to repress and exterminate black Darfurian rebels) revolted against the military government. This dynamic seems counter-intuitive, as both factions subscribe to the same Arab supremacist beliefs and have casually engaged in mass rape and indiscriminate violence against civilians. However, the RSF’s origins as peripheral Arab ethnic nationalists (mainly pastoralists who erstwhile share the Darfur region with black tribes) explains some of their antagonism towards the traditional central Sudanese elites. Mohamad Hamdan Dagalo (known more widely by his nom de guerre Hermediti) initiated the insurgency due to his fears that the junta would marginalise the RSF by bringing back Islamist figures from Bashir’s government. This has also resulted in the perverse situation that Hermediti has presented himself as an anti-Islamist fighter (female members of the RSF are promoted online, often infighting violence against northern Sudanese tribes) and also as a promoter of the multiethnic and secular ‘New Sudan’. To confuse things, he has opportunistically allied himself with black militias, many of whom are stranded South Sudanese groups isolated in the north after the end of the previous civil war.

The role of UAE (which has been involved in fostering secessionism in Somalia and in supporting the Haftar Tobruk based government in Libya, more on which later) has been critical in advancing Hermediti as a future kingmaker in Sudan. Driven by realpolitik, which saw the Sunni Muslim state support the normalisation of relations the Assad regime prior to its ouster, the UAE has probably the least ‘Ummah conscious’ foreign policy of all the Gulf states. It primarily sees Hermediti as a guarantor of its extensive mineral interests in the country. It has also been rhetorically critical of Muslim immigration to Europe as enabling a ‘boomerang’ effect of radicalisation in the ‘Dar-al-Islam’. It is, therefore, an obvious strategic partner in promoting the multilateral resettlement of Muslims in Europe to demographic borderlands of the Arab world. While the civil war has reached a stalemate, a military and economic package of support to the Hermediti government in exchange for taking the 35,000 Sudanese born population of Britain, and perhaps eventually millions of Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Arabs, could turn the tides in his favour. It should also be noted that this could also be extended to SAF government, or that, for a period at least, both sides could be entertained to see which one will be ultimately more favourable to our plans for the region.

Libya

Libya is another obvious prime location for the resettlement of denaturalised foreign descended peoples. Adjacent to Europe but locked in an on and off civil war since the ousting of Gaddafi in 2011, it offers the possibility of leveraging influence with the respective Tripoli and Tobruk based governments with the aim of resettling Europe’s Arab diaspora.

Libya was originally (allegedly) discussed by Martin Sellner as part of a ‘secret’ conference conducted with senior AfD officials and business figures. He purportedly proposed establishing migrant charter cities, which would function as ‘model colonies’ and contain upwards of 1 million people. Libya would certainly be capable of absorbing the entirety of Britain’s 350,000 Arab population, with a population of only 7 million. Libya, as an Arab and relatively sparsely populated state geographically adjacent to Europe, makes sense as a destination for at least some members of ~7 million Arab population of Europe. Khalifa Haftar, leader of the opposition Libyan National Army, which controls the eastern half of the country, has already offered his support in combating migration to Europe. In fact, Khalifa Haftar has met senior EU delegations with a view to affecting some type of multilateral arrangement aimed at stemming further migration. It’s not unreasonable to expect that they might be receptive to hosting significant numbers of Arabs given the right incentives.

South Yemen

The most recent example of Emirati politicking is the UDI declared by the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which controls most of the former British possession of Yemen. Representing Sunni Muslims who are tribally distinct from the Saudi backed internationally recognised government, ‘the State of South Arabia’ could act as an additional strategically located site for denaturalised diasporics from the West. Outside of the framework of either the ‘Axis of Resistance’ or Riyadh’s anti-revisionist coalition, it currently relies on the goodwill of the UAE and Israel (two states which have established a common foreign policy front for the region). It therefore can be brought into a broader diplomatic arrangement with Western patronised statelets. Aden alongside Berbera could also provide secure transit points for remigrants to the subcontinent.

Mali

Finally, Mali, now something of a meme on the international right for its tomato paste obsessed multipolarist government, would also be a logical final linchpin in the grand Sahelian population transfer proposed by this article. The black junta of Assimi Gouta has, despite significant Russian support, been unable to decisively defeat the coalition of Tuareg rebels represented by the Front for the Liberation of Azawad and the Arab Azawad Movement. It would be relatively easy for Western states (Ukraine has already lent material aid to insurgents) to tip the tide decisively in favour of the Caucasian Muslim tribes of the north. It would also align with a broader geopolitical strategy of combating Moscow’s influence (or at least could be rationalised in those terms for the neoconservatively oriented). An independent Azawad, dependent upon an Occidental alliance and facing off a Bantu revanchist rump state to the south, would be obligated to accept resettled Arabs and Berbers from Europe. Not only this, but they might look at such a move as positively strengthening their nascent state.

Conclusion

As stated before, multilateral resettlement is not an exclusive solution to our continent’s demographic dilemma. Bilateral repatriation will occur to various countries, primarily those states (like the Syrian Arab Republic and the Emirate of Afghanistan), which need international legitimisation and/or international support for domestic reconstruction. Hopefully, the support of the United States, particularly under a future Vance administration, might help pressure larger states like India and Pakistan into taking back their respective diasporas. But for the many populations present in Europe, whose presence we cannot continue to permit, the Sahel presents a suitable demographic sponge. As stated before, many underestimate the reticence of Asian states about taking back their co-ethnics. Simply relocating undesirables in a willing third-party host bypasses this problem. Ultimately, we should aim to construct a version of the Abraham Accords centred on demographic outsourcing. A network of statelets on the Middle East’s periphery will be established, in alignment with progressive actors in the region willing to defect on their co-religionists.